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I. INTRODUCTION
On the 100th anniversary of the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, it is entirely appropriate tolook back at the accomplishments of that event, and at the strides that have been made over the pastcentury for developing international law and institutions. Perhaps more important, however, is toconsider the direction international law will take during the next 100 years—to ask about the legacythat will be discussed at the 200th anniversary of the Hague Conference. The purpose of this essayis to consider the past, present and, especially, future state of the jus ad bellum, the set of rules ininternational law designed to regulate the resort to war by states. Will the jus ad bellum in 2107 lookthe same as it does today or, as was the case for the past 100 years, might we anticipate efforts toprogressively develop it in some fashion?
The jus ad bellum is generally viewed as a static field of law. The standard account is thatwhen the UN Charter was adopted in 1945, it enshrined a complete prohibition on the use of forcein inter-state relations, except when action is being taken in self-defense against an armed attack orunder authorization of the UN Security Council. No other exceptions to the general prohibition arepermitted, whether for purposes of rescuing ones nationals abroad, saving aliens from widespreaddeprivation of human rights, acting preemptively against a grave but distant threat, or for any otherreason. 
_________________________________________* Patricia Roberts Harris Research Professor of Law, George Washington University. This essaybenefitted from comments by Vijay Padmanabhan and by participants at both the Walther-Schücking-Instituts für Internationales Recht November 2007 conference in Kiel, Germany, and theTemple Law School March 2008 International Law Colloquium in Philadelphia. My thanks to KellyDunn for research assistance.
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To the extent that some states or commentators see value in further exceptions, the approachis generally still to view the jus ad bellum as static, but to engage in contorted interpretations of theCharter’s text so as to allow further exceptions, or to admit that no exceptions exist but to argue thatdeviation is legitimate in extreme circumstances even if not lawful. Of course some observers, whoseviews are largely grounded in realism theories of international relations, simply conclude that the jusad bellum is a utopian notion that has no real relevance for contemporary inter-state behavior.
Yet it seems likely that in the years to come, many states and non-state actors willincreasingly insist upon a different vision of the jus ad bellum, one that conceives of it as moreprotean in nature. Protean jus ad bellum acknowledges that, as of 1945,  the static view was correct,but that over time—as we approach the 70th anniversary of the United Nations—the jus ad bellumis changing, buffeted in particular by several significant developments: (1) the emergence ofweapons of mass destruction of various types potentially controllable by states and non-state actors;(2) the rise of global terrorism as a mechanism for projecting violence against states by non-stateactors; (3) the elevation of the person to a central place in the realm of international law, both interms of being protected and in terms of being accountable for misconduct; (4) the inability of theSecurity Council to be accepted by all states as a disinterested arbiter willing and capable of actingto address all threats to international peace and security as they arise; and (5) the continuing erosionof the sanctity of the sovereign state, resulting from exposure to myriad effects of globalization,including intrusive transnational  rule of law programs, election monitoring, incessant and extensivemedia coverage, powerful transnational corporations and non-governmental organization, andrelatively unrestricted transborder movement of capital, goods, and persons across borders.
Further, protean jus ad bellum refers to a normative regime that is less oriented toward atextual codification of the norm and more toward its practical and nuanced application in a complexand changing global environment. As such, protean jus ad bellum resists a binary approach ofregarding all uses of force of a particular type (e.g., humanitarian intervention) as beinglawful/unlawful in all situations, and favors instead an approach that calibrates a range of factors that
3are important in predicting the likely response of the global community to a coercive act. Certainforms of state practice, such as the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia in support of Kosovar Albanians,will lend credence to the vision of protean jus ad bellum, even as other state practice continues tosupport the static view.
This essay suggests that the failure to either formally accept or reject the idea of protean jusad bellum is likely, over time, to diminish the jus ad bellum’s effectiveness as a normative  regime.Already, there exists considerable confusion or disagreement about the contemporary parameters ofthe jus ad bellum; if you were to ask a random group of legal advisers to foreign ministries theirviews on whether, for example, humanitarian intervention, or using force to rescue nationals abroad,or a cross-border raid against a terrorist camp, are permissible under the jus ad bellum, you are likelyto receive a mixture of answers: some saying yes; some saying no; some insisting that it depends onthe circumstances; and some refusing to respond to the question. Too often transnational uses ofmilitary force are occurring in circumstances that are inconsistent with the idea of a static jus adbellum: states and non-state actors are, at least in some situations, tolerating certain types of forcein response to the overarching developments noted above. As the International Criminal Courtmoves closer to including aggression within its mandate for indicting and prosecuting persons,government leaders may see greater value in clarifying what uses of force are permissible.
Things could continue as they are. But in the long-term, if the jus ad bellum is not to breakdown, then a more formal way should be found either to reject the notion of protean jus ad bellumor to accept it, and if the latter, then to try to identify the contemporary rules in this area, eitherthrough formal amendment of the UN Charter, through authoritative interpretations by the principalorgans of the United Nations or regional organizations, or through other means.
II. STATIC JUS AD BELLUM
In many areas of international law, the law accommodates the possibility of change. Underthe Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, for example, practice of the parties subsequent to the
41 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(b), May 23, 1969, 1155U.N.T.S. 331 (VCLT).
2 See, e.g., Louis B. Sohn, Interpreting the Law, in UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 186-87 (Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995).
3 See, e.g., Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to theUnited Nations, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 15 (Mar. 3) (dissenting opinion of Judge Alvarez)  (asserting thatICJ decisions “create precedents” and dynamically change international law).
4 Charter of the United Nations, art. 2(4), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031.
5 Id., art. 51.
6 Id., arts. 41 & 42.
entry into force of  treaty is a salient factor for interpreting and reinterpreting the meaning of thetreaty.1 Even if the treaty meant X1 at the time it was adopted, practice by the states thereafter maychange the norm to mean X2. In the context of a treaty establishing an international organization,such practice may include precedents set by institutional practice of the organization itself;moreover, greater license is typically granted for teleological interpretations of such treaties inrecognition of the need for the international organization to evolve over time.2
Customary international law, of course, is also built upon the idea that contemporary statepractice, in conjunction with opinio juris, serves to establish the law, even if that law was differentat some earlier time. General principles of law, the third main source of international law, can alsochange to the extent that principles of law operating in legal systems worldwide change over time.International judicial decisions, though in theory limited to the parties in the case before the tribunal,are widely regarded as assisting in the development and evolution of international law over time.3
The jus ad bellum, however, is viewed by most states and scholars as a static norm. UnderArticle 2(4) of the UN Charter, a state may not use force against another state.4 Under Article 51, astate may respond in self-defense to an “armed attack.”5 Under Chapter VII of the Charter, the UNSecurity Council, in response to a threat to the peace, may authorize states to take forcible measures.6
57 Id., art. 103.
8 The VCLT defines jus cogens as a norm “accepted and recognised by the internationalcommunity of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which canbe modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”VCLT, supra note 1, art. 53. The ICJ has referred to the prohibition on the use of force by onestate against another as “a conspicuous example” of jus cogens,  Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 100, para. 190 (June 27). 
Put all together, static jus ad bellum maintains that a state may not use armed force against anotherstate unless it is defending against an armed attack or is authorized by the Security Council to do so.
Though it has been more than sixty years since enactment of the Charter, and though thereis considerable state practice involving uses of coercion in circumstances that do not fit the basicparadigm, no consensus exists that the paradigm has changed in any significant way. No doubt thereare several reasons why this particular norm has continued to be viewed as static. First, as a formalmatter, since  the norm is enshrined in the Charter, and since the Charter has a superior status withinthe hierarchy of international law,7 there is a reluctance to see the norm change absent a formalalteration, such as through amendment of the Charter. This is not to say that the Charter can onlychange through formal amendment; plenty of examples exist of changes to the Charter throughconsensus interpretation of the UN member states. Yet such change is not common and does requirea high threshold of consensus. Second, the jus ad bellum is considered a fundamental element ininternational law, so much so that most view it as a norm of jus cogens that cannot be altered bystates even through treaty relations.8 While alterations of other norms may have significant socialor economic effects (e.g., establishing and expanding an exclusive economic zone outside theterritorial sea), the stakes in altering the jus ad bellum are viewed as considerably higher, and aspotentially unleashing a wide range of undesirable coercive behavior. Third, by its nature, the fieldof jus ad bellum does not have extensive and repeated state practice that allows for definitiveevolution of the norm; rather, incidents are sparse, can often be distinguished through reference tounique factual scenarios, and often elicit conflicting interpretations by states and scholars concerning
69 See Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L. REV. 699(2005).
the significance of the incident for the law.9
The principal actors that might formally recognize a change in the norm for the most parthave no incentive to do so. Senior government officials in most states have a vested interest inpreserving to the extent possible a norm that prevents transnational uses of force, as a means offortifying their own authority with respect to external threats. Indeed, states without the power toproject force across boundaries appear to fear that formal changes in the jus ad bellum would besimply a subterfuge for potential interventionist policies of the major powers. By contrast, the morepowerful states (e.g., the United States or United Kingdom) seem to favor the ability to use coerciveforce in ways that deviate from the static jus ad bellum paradigm, since they tend not to feelthreatened by a change. Yet even those states may prefer to try to pigeon-hole their conduct into thestatic jus ad bellum paradigm, rather than create a new precedent that might someday work to theirdisadvantage. Meanwhile, groups that might be best served through a change in the paradigm, suchas persons facing human rights crises brought on or tolerated by their government, have little formalvoice in the state-centric system about whether and how the paradigm should change. For all thesereasons, the jus ad bellum as it was conceived in 1945 remains the dominant paradigm, at leastformally, today.
III. PROTEAN JUS AD BELLUM
While there is no formal consensus that the jus ad bellum has changed from the time it wasenshrined in the UN Charter, there is considerable reason to think that is not a static norm, and thatinformal expectations by states and other actors about it have evolved over time and will continueto evolve in the future. Though in the aftermath of the two world wars, consensus crystalized on abroad-scale prohibition on the use of armed force, other overarching developments since 1945—thedevelopment of weapons of mass destruction, the rise of human rights law, and the emergence ofglobal terrorism as a mechanism for projecting violence against states by non-state actors—have
710  The principal concern of Russian Tsar Nicholas II in convening the Hague PeaceConferences lay in a desire to limit the number of armaments possessed by the major powers ofthe world and hence to secure a durable peace, an effort that ultimately was not successful. Seegenerally CALVIN D. DAVIS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE FIRST HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE(1962).
11 1907 Hague Convention II Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force forthe Recovery of Contract Debts, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2241.
12 1907 Hague Convention III Relative to the Commencement of Hostilities, art. 1, o9ct.18, 1907.
significantly affected attitudes toward permissible uses of force. In the face of these challenges, acredible case can be made that the jus ad bellum has not remained static, but has changed and ischanging, or assumes different meanings when faced with different situations. 
A. The Pre-Charter Era
A starting point for viewing the jus ad bellum as protean in nature is to take the long viewand recognize that the static position is of relatively recent vintage, itself a product of change. TheHague Peace Conference of 1907, in conjunction with its 1899 predecessor, ushered in a remarkablecentury for the growth of public international law.10 Part of that growth entailed the emergence ofa highly restrictive jus ad bellum that did not previously exist; indeed, at the start of the twentiethcentury, there was no globally-accepted norm prohibiting the resort to war. The conventions adoptedat the two peace conferences, however, began the process of limiting the means by which statescould resort to warfare. Thus, the 1907 Hague Convention II prohibited the resort to war completelywhen the objective was the recovery of debt, unless the debtor State refused or neglected to resolvethe matter through arbitration.11 The Hague Convention III required states not to commencehostilities without previous and explicit warning.12 
That military force should be resorted to only for good reasons or just cause was, of course,a sentiment that preceded the Hague Peace Conferences, harkening back to the just war doctrine of
813 AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO, DE CIVITATE DEI (THE CITY OF GOD) bk. 19, at 7 (1958);THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA ch. II-II, quae. 40, art. 1, reprinted in ST. THOMASAQUINAS ON POLITICS AND ETHICS 64-65 (P. Sigmund ed.) ( trans., 1988).
14 See 1 ROBERT PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW 17-18 (3d ed.1879); ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 10-11 (rev. ed. 1954).
15 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, art. 1, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343.
Augustine and Aquinas,13 and even further back to the bellum justum et pium doctrine of earlyRoman law.14 Yet in Hague Convention II is found the first effort at a conventional prohibition onresort to war in a particular circumstance, where the purpose—economic redress—was consideredthe least compelling for unleashing the dogs of war. By 1928, some states were willing to take theconsiderably more extensive step of adhering to an instrument, the Kellogg-Briand Pact (or Pact ofParis), by which they “condemn[ed] recourse to war for the solution of international controversies,and renounce[d] it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.”15 
B. Direct Aggression by States
The Kellogg-Briand Pact failed to stem the outbreak of World War II, but it set the stage forthe codification of Article 2(4) the UN Charter, the center-piece around which the static jus adbellum is now built. Though often debated, questioned, interpreted, and reinterpreted, Article 2(4),in conjunction with Article 51, has established a quite stable and clear core normative proscription:States are prohibited from using force against other states unless they are acting in self-defense orunder Security Council authorization. Though overt military attacks by one state against anothercontinue to this day, they are readily condemned by the global community and they often, though notinvariably, elicit significant counter-measures against the aggressor state.  Efforts by one state toannex another are almost unheard of—Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait being the exception that proves therule—leaving instead projections of force designed to temporarily punish a state, diminish itsmilitary capacity, or perhaps adjust a bilateral boundary.  Hence, at its heart, the jus ad bellum nowprovides a formidable normative structure unheard of even 100 years ago.
916 See generally NIKOLAS STÜRCHLER, THE THREAT OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW(2007); Marco Roscini, Threats of Armed Force and Contemporary International Law, 54 NETH.INT’L L. REV. 229 (2007).
17 See, e.g., LILLICH ON THE FORCIBLE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS ABROAD (Thomas C.Wingfield & James E. Meyen eds., 2002) (volume 77 of the U.S. Naval War College Studiesseries); NATALINO RONZITTI, RESCUING NATIONALS ABROAD THROUGH MILITARY COERCIONAND INTERVENTION ON GROUNDS OF HUMANITY (1985).
18 See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES(1963); THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS ANDARMED ATTACKS (2002); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE (2ded. 2004).
Even so, from the start, uncertainty existed about the scope and content of this basicparadigm. Given that Article 2(4) only refers to “force,” is the prohibition limited to use of armedforce or does it proscribe other forms of coercion as well? What exactly is meant by prohibiting“threats” to use force?16 If a state’s nationals are seized abroad by another state and held hostage, isthat a “use of force” within the meaning of Article 2(4)? If a state responds to such action by usingmilitary force to rescue its nationals, is that self-defense against an “armed attack” within themeaning of Article 51? Various examples of “rescue of nationals” exist in state practice, but theconcept does not sit easily within the terms of the Charter and hence has been controversial.17 Inshort, even within the core Article 2(4)/Article 51 paradigm, difficult questions have arisen,prompting extensive commentary over the years.18
C. Indirect Aggression by States
Uses of force during the Cold War became much more complex than the type of aggressionthat spawned World War II. Though direct armed conflict between states remained an importantconcern, other forms of coercion came to pose a more difficult challenge to the jus ad bellum.During the Cold War, the problem of indirect aggression forcefully emerged, whereby one statesurreptitiously supplied military and economic support to mercenaries, rebels or insurgents againstanother state. If one were giving a talk in the 1960's about “new threats” in the jus ad bellum, indirectaggression by states would have been the focal point of the discussion. And because of that, it
10
19 The path breaking study on this phenomenon remains ROSALYN HIGGINS, THEDEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITEDNATIONS (1963).
20 See generally UNITED NATIONS, HISTORICAL REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TOAGGRESSION 225-51 (2003).
21 S.C. Res. 405 (Apr. 14, 1977).
22 G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974).
became important to again revisit what exactly was meant by Article 2(4) and Article 51, in orderto elaborate upon what was left unsaid.
One important mechanism for illuminating the meaning of the jus ad bellum was through itsinterpretation, in the context of specific incidents of state practice, by the principal organs of theUnited Nations—the Security Council and the General Assembly.19  Throughout the initial decadesof the Charter, those organs adopted various resolutions considering the projection of coercion invarious contexts, especially in the Middle East and Southern Africa.20 In some instances, the practiceeven concerned attacks by a non-state actor against a state, such as the Security Council’scondemnation as “aggression” of the 1977 attack by an invading force of mercenaries on theMarxist-led government in Benin.21
Another important mechanism were interpretations by UN organs in a more generalizedfashion. In 1974 the General Assembly adopted its resolution on the Definition of Aggression,22which served to provide a non-exhaustive list of the kinds of coercion that would violate Article2(4). The standard paradigm of one state invading or bombarding another state was included, ofcourse, but so were other types of coercion that might have been seen as falling outside the scopeof Article 2(4), such as the blockading of ports. The Definition of Aggression recognized thatcoercion violating Article 2(4) could arise from transboundary conduct of non-state actors—“armedbands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries, at least when such actors were sent “by or on behalf of aState” and when the coercion was “of such gravity” as to amount the kinds of coercion prohibited
11
23 Id., art. 3(g).
24 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
25 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).
to states.23
The 1986 judgment by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case24 served assomething of a lightening rod for consideration of the meaning of direct and indirect aggression inthe Cold War era. The Court had not previously opined on the meaning of Articles 2(4) and 51,though it had addressed some issues relating to the use force in the course of deciding the CorfuChannel case.25 The reasoning of the Court in Nicaragua was initially somewhat clouded by thehighly charged politics of the case, as well as the U.S. refusal to participate in the merits phase, butover time the Court’s judgment seems to have passed into the corpus of accepted jurisprudence, tothe point where the United States itself now cites to the judgment as authority. 
The basic paradigm set forth by the Nicaragua case found that certain acts, such as themining of another state’s harbors and attacks on another state’s naval vessels and oil facilities, wereviolations of Article 2(4), a not particularly surprising outcome. More interesting was the Court’sconclusion that certain acts in violation of Article 2(4) might not rise to the threshold of being an“armed attack” for purposes of Article 51, and therefore could not be responded to through theexercise of self-defense. This lack of symmetry between Articles 2(4) and 51 is well-groundedtextually in the Charter, but it also rather unsatisfactorily invites coercive behavior that operatesbelow the radar of “armed attack,” and hence has been criticized.
Another notable feature of the Court’s decision was its recognition that an armed attackmight occur through the conduct of non-state actors operating across a border. In that regard, theCourt confirmed that attribution of such conduct to a State was important in triggering a right of self-defense against that State. Since the Court was not persuaded that the assistance to the Salvadorian
12
26 IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 278 (1963)(“the view that Article 51 does not permit anticipatory action is correct and . . . arguments to thecontrary are either unconvincing or based on inconclusive pieces of evidence.”); IAN BROWNLIE,PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 702 (6th ed. 2003) (“Since 1945 the practice ofStates generally has been opposed to anticipatory self-defence.”). 
27 See, e.g., QUINCY WRIGHT, THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ELIMINATION OFWAR 60 (1961) (“it is not unreasonable to assume that an ‘armed attack’ is intended to include animmediate threat of armed attack, thus justifying military counteraction in individual orcollective self-defence before there is an actual armed attack.”).
armed opposition was imputable to Nicaragua, nor that it was on a “scale of any significance,” theUnited States had no right to embark on collective self-defense on behalf of El Salvador againstNicaragua.
D. Distant But Grave Threats
The Cold War also saw uncertainty about the temporal scope of the right of self-defenseunder the Charter. Some maintained that a state could only respond in self-defense after havingsuffered an armed attack from another state. The text of Article 51 supports that position, since itacknowledges a right of self-defense only “if an armed attack occurs” against a UN Member.26 
Yet the complex ways in which contemporary armed coercion can occur, and the direconsequences of a delayed response to that coercion, have prompted observers to advance variousarguments for why self-defense may be undertaken even prior to an armed attack. One approach isto emphasize a right of anticipatory or  interceptive self-defense, by which is meant acting in self-defense when there is convincing evidence that an armed attack is occurring even though the attackerhas not yet penetrated the defending state’s frontier.27 Thus, while it was Israel who first opened firein the 1967 Six Days War, it has been argued that Israel was responding to an “incipient armed attackby Egypt (joined by Jordan and Syria),” as evidenced by Egypt’s “peremptory ejection of the UnitedNations Emergency Force from the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula; the closure of the Straits ofTiran; the unprecedented build-up of Egyptian forces along Israel’s borders; and constant sabre-
13
28 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 172-73 (3d ed. 2001).
29 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 361-62 (2d ed. 2005).
30 UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, para.188, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2005) [hereinafter “High-level Panel Report”]. 
31 For a recent proposal, with a preference for authorization by the United Nations or aregional organization, but allowing residually for unilateral action, see Lee Feinstein & Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 136, 137 (Jan./Feb. 2004) (“Like theresponsibility to protect, the duty to prevent begins from the premise that the rules nowgoverning the use of force, devised in 1945 and embedded in the UN Charter, are inadequate.”).
rattling statements about the impending fighting.”28 Those in favor of allowing such anticipatory orinterceptive self-defense sought to extend the concept of an external armed attack to the earlieststages of its unfolding (e.g., an “armed attack” begins as soon as your opponent commences warmingup its missile silos or directing its battle carrier group toward your coast) or sought to downplay theexpress text of Article 51 as illustrating but not limiting the manner of self-defense. As a last resort,some observers have stated that such anticipatory action was unlawful, but “may be justified onmoral and political grounds,” such that “the community will eventually condone [it] or mete outlenient condemnation.”29 
Some state practice supported this position but, as in most areas of the jus ad bellum, thepractice was too infrequent and too contested to lead to a consensus position. In 2005, a high-levelpanel of experts convened by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued a report endorsing theconcept of a limited right of unilateral preemptive action when “the threatened attack is imminent,no other means would deflect it and the action is proportionate.”30
Still others have insisted that for especially grave threats, such as the development of anuclear or other mass destruction weapon by an unpredictable state, it was also permissible to resortto armed force months or even years in advance to prevent the threat from occurring.31 Sporadicpractice lent some credence to this concept of preemptive or preventive self-defense, such as the1962 U.S.-led “quarantine” of Cuba in response to the planned deployment of long-range missiles
14
32 G.A. Res. 36/27 (Nov. 13, 1981).
33 S.C. Res. 487 (June 19, 1981).
34 WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OFAMERICA 15 (Sept. 17, 2002) (“For centuries, international law recognized that nations need notsuffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces thatpresent an imminent danger of attack. . . . We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to thecapabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.”).
35 See Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. 173, 174-76(2004).
36 UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel Report, supra note 30, at para. 190.
or the 1986 U.S. bombing raids against Libya purportedly to stem future Libyan terrorism. Yet,again, the practice was too uneven to demonstrate widespread acceptance. Indeed, in some instances,such as the 1981 Israeli attack against a nascent Iraqi nuclear facility at Osirak, the condemnationof the action by the UN General Assembly as “aggression”32 and by the Security Council as aviolation of the UN Charter33 strongly suggested that such action was prohibited.
Most recently, this concept of preemptive or preventive self-defense was endorsed by theBush Administration in its statements on the U.S. national security strategy, which identified anevolving right under international law for the United States to use military force preemptively againstthe threat posed by “rogue states” possessing WMDs.34 The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, thoughtechnically undertaken based on a legal theory of Security Council authorization,35 has widely beeninterpreted as an application of the doctrine of preemptive or preventive self-defense. The 2005 U.N.high-level panel did not adopt this concept, finding that if there are “good arguments for preventivemilitary action, with good evidence to support them, they should be put to the Security Council,which can authorize such action if it chooses to.”36
E. Grave Threats to Persons
One of the signature developments of international law in the twentieth century was the rise
15
37 See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, inHUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167, 177 (Richard Lillich ed., 1973).
38 See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER & JENS DAVID OHLIN, DEFENDING HUMANITY: WHENFORCE IS JUSTIFIED AND WHY (2008). 
39 See, e.g., FERNANDO TÉSON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAWAND MORALITY (3d ed. 2005).
of human rights; the recognition that central to the project of the rule of law in inter-state affairs isthe protection of persons from the excesses of their own governments. At the time the Charter wasadopted, the concept of human rights was known, but was radically under-developed. Through theestablishment of a series of multilateral treaties and associated institutions, human rights hasemerged as a powerful normative regime for identifying protections that states owe to their nationalsand for promoting the global monitoring of those rights. Moreover, the field of human rights hashelped open the door for imposition of criminal responsibility on those persons who unleash humanrights violations and in some situations illuminated connections between rights-abuse and threatsto international peace.
The interface of human rights protections and the use of force prohibition has been troubled,especially since the end of the Cold War. The static jus ad bellum paradigm on its face provides noopening for the transnational use of force to protect the rights of persons within the targeted stateabsent Security Council authorization. Textual arguments have been deployed in favor of regardinghumanitarian intervention as consistent with Article 2(4) since it is not the kind of force proscribedby that article37 or as consistent with Article 51 since “self-defense” necessarily embraces the notionof defense of others,38 while arguments more rooted in moral philosophy or natural law call forinterpreting ambiguous rules in favor a just outcome, thus permitting use of force when necessaryto save lives.39 
Arguable examples of intervention undertaken to prevent human rights crises occurred duringthe Cold War, such as the interventions of India in East Pakistan in 1971, Vietnam in Cambodia in1978, or Tanzania in Uganda to oust Idi Amin. After the Cold War, humanitarian crises in the 1990's,
16
40 See, e.g., SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS INAN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 43-46 (1996); NICHOLAS J. WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS:HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (2000); HUMANITARIANINTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O.Keohane eds., 2003).
41 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect (Dec. 2001), available at<http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp> [hereinafter The Responsibility to Protect].
42 For a discussion of the emergence of this concept, see Carsten Stahn, Responsibility toProtect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99 (2007).
43 The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 41, para. 6.37.
especially in Rwanda, continued to provoke a robust debate over the legality of humanitarianintervention.40 Perhaps the high point to date was the March/April 1999 NATO bombing campaignagainst the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia), undertaken to prevent its government fromengaging in ethnic cleansing and atrocities in the autonomous province of Kosovo, which in 2008has become an independent state. 
Shortly after the Kosovo incident, an International Commission on Intervention and StateSovereignty (ICISS) (established by the Government of Canada) issued a December 2001 reportentitled The Responsibility to Protect, which sought to provide a legal and ethical foundation forhumanitarian intervention.41 The report asserted that a responsibility to protect (or “R2P”)42 existsunder international law. Further, the report stated that in circumstances when the Security Councilfails to discharge that responsibility, “in a conscience-shocking situation crying out for action,” thenit “is a real question in these circumstances where lies the most harm: in the damage to internationalorder if the Security Council is bypassed or in the damage to that order if human beings areslaughtered while the Security Council stands by.”43 By contrast, the 2005 U.N. high-level panel,writing in the wake of the 2003 U.S. intervention in Iraq, agreed with the ICISS that there existedan “emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect,” but concludedthat armed force may be used to fulfil the responsibility only if so authorized by the Security
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44 UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel Report, supra note 30, at paras. 203; see alsoid., paras. 196, 272.
45 Id., para. 207.
46 In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Reportof the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005, para. 135 (2005).
47 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, paras. 138-39 (Oct. 24, 2005).
48 See Stahn, supra note 42, at 120 (finding that “states did not categorically reject theoption of (individual or collective) unilateral action in the Outcome Document. This discrepancyleaves some leeway to argue that the concept of responsibility to protect is not meant to rule outsuch action in the future.”).
49 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note 24, at 134-35,at paras. 267-68. 
50 Id., at 133, para. 263.
Council.44 Further, the high-level panel identified five criteria of “legitimacy” when engaging in suchintervention, relating to the seriousness of the threat, the proper purpose of the intervenors, theexhaustion of other means, proportionality, and a balancing of the ensuing consequences.45 The U.N.Secretary-General thereafter generally endorsed the high-level panel’s approach46 as did the GeneralAssembly in its 2005 World Summit Outcome document,47 though neither expressly adopted the fivecriteria nor expressly ruled out the unilateral use of force.48
While the ICISS drew the line for humanitarian intervention at “conscience-shockingsituations crying out for action,” others have argued in favor of using force to protect a broader arrayof human rights. Thus, rather than limit the use of force only to extreme situations, such as to preventgenocide or crimes against humanity, some favor deployment of armed force to restore a democraticgovernment to power (as arguably occurred with the U.S. intervention in Grenada in 1983). No doubtwith an eye on these emerging threats, the Nicaragua Court issued statements casting doubt on theability of states to use force to protect human rights49 or to bring about regime change,50 althoughthose statements are probably best construed in the context of the facts presented and the positionspled (or not pled) in that case.
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51 Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in theOccupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).
52 Id., at 194, para. 139. 
F. Grave Threats from Transnational Terrorism
If one were to identify the “new threats” faced at the beginning of the 21st century, manyobservers would likely point to the problem of potential projection of force on a massive scale bynon-state actors, operating largely independently from state control or direction. The ability of non-state actors to project force across boundaries was readily apparent even before 9/11, but 9/11 seemsto have raised the awareness level to unprecedented heights. It rather focuses one mind when aterrorist group, Al Qaeda, can organize itself so as launch an attack halfway around the world thatinflicts, in a single day, some 3,000 casualties, destroying the World Trade Center, and severelydamaging the command center of the U.S. military. Attacks associated with Al Qaeda have occurredannually since 9/11 in various countries from Spain to Indonesia to the United Kingdom.
Does the jus ad bellum speak to such attacks? By its terms, Article 2(4) prohibits uses offorce by one state against another state. Article 51 is less definitive in addressing only inter-statebehavior, but arguably the Charter was designed solely to speak to rights and obligations as betweenstates, and any act of self-defense must be in response to an armed attack committed by orattributable to another state. The Nicaragua Court’s viewed attribution of non-state actor conductto a state as a salient factor before the jus ad bellum is implicated, and that view was confirmed andapparently extended by the Court’s 2004 Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Wall.51 In that opinion, theCourt rather summarily dismissed Israel’s claim that it was acting in self-defense against attacks byterrorist groups. According to the Court, Israel could not possibly be acting in self-defense underArticle 51 because Israel had not claimed that the terrorist attacks at issue were imputable to aforeign state and because those attacks were not transnational in nature, having occurred whollywithin territory occupied by Israel.52  
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53 Compare Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: AnIpse Dixit from the ICJ?, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 62 (2005) with Iain Scobbie, Words My MotherNever Taught Me—“In Defense of the International Court”, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 76 (2005); seealso Christian J. Tams, Light Treatment of a Complex Problem: The Law of Self-Defence in theWall Case, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L.  963, 963 (2005) (finding that the Court’s opinion on self-defenseis “difficult to bring in line with modern state practice, and increases the pressure to admit other,non-written, exceptions to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.”).
54 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), 2006 I.C.J. 168,223, para. 147 (Dec. 19, 2005).
The advisory opinion thus appears to extend the Nicaragua paradigm by saying that it is notpossible under any circumstances to engage in an act of self-defense under international law againsta non-state actor; rather, you can only engage in an act of self-defense against another state, and thusonly in situations where the acts of the non-state actor are imputable to that other state. Why that isthe case, however, especially in light of the reaction of the global community (including the SecurityCouncil, NATO, and the OAS) to the attacks by Al Qaeda of 9/11 as justifying a response in self-defense, the Court failed to explain, notwithstanding the admonitions of some of the judges in theirseparate opinions.53 Criticisms of the Court’s position may have prompted the Court to backtrackin its 2005 case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, where the Court moretentatively noted that, given the circumstances of the case, there was “no need to respond to thecontentions of the Parties as to whether and under what conditions contemporary international lawprovides for a right of self-defense against large-scale attacks by irregular forces.”54
The ability of non-state actors to project such force transnationally is coupled with the fearthat the next time it will not be airplanes but a weapon of mass destruction. Considerable attentionis paid to the possibility of a nuclear attack, yet there is also concern that chemical weapons will beused whose toxic properties produce physical or physiological effects—chlorine, phosgene, mustardgas, or nerve gases (such as sarin) come to mind.  Similarly, there are fears that a terrorist groupmight concoct a biological weapon capable of disseminating infectious diseases or conditions thatotherwise do not exist or only exist naturally, by using bacteria (e.g., anthrax), viruses (e.g.,smallpox), or toxins (e.g., ricin). There are, of course, considerable hurdles for non-state actors in
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55 See, e.g., Allen S. Weiner, The Use of Force and Contemporary Security Threats: OldMedicine for New Ills?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 415 (2006).
obtaining and delivering such weapons, but they are not insurmountable hurdles, and highly-respected analysts believe the odds to be fairly high that such an attack will eventually occur.
Large-scale terrorist attacks through weapons of mass destruction are not the only “newthreat.” Mavens of our “information age” observe that new methods of cyber-warfare are becominga reality, by which states and non-state actors with a comparative disadvantage in hardware may seekto level the playing field through attacks on software. Even non-traditional dangers such as thetransboundary movement of infectious diseases, living modified organisms, invasive plant species,or persistent organic chemicals may emerge as grave threats to which states seek to respond forcibly.
IV. REAFFIRMING OR RECODIFYING THE JUS AD BELLUM
A. Maintaining the Status Quo
Defenders of the static view of the jus ad bellum view the classic 1945 paradigm asnormatively the best way of organizing inter-state behavior.55 States are permitted to defendthemselves when exposed to an armed attack and states are permitted to use force when authorizedby the Security Council. In all other circumstances, uses of military force are prohibited, even if tointended to prevent human rights atrocities, because any further exceptions threaten to swallow thebasic rules. Some defenders may maintain that the rule is sacrosanct, but concede (either publiclyor in private conversation) that deviations in extreme situations are legitimate even if not technicallylawful.
Critics of the static view assert that there are situations where uses of force should be allowedto promote world order, so they typically seek to read the original Charter text as allowing for
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57 See, e.g., Richard N. Gardner, Neither Bush Nor the “Jurisprudes,” 97 AM. J. INT’L L.585, 586 (2003) (“The new strategic environment, marked by suicidal terrorists and the spread ofmass destruction weapons, requires a different approach.”); Jane E. Stromseth, Law and ForceAfter Iraq: A Transitional Moment, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 628, 637 (2007) (“If international rulesgoverning resort to force are to endure, they must be built upon and reflect the realities of powerand the security needs that confront states in the real world.”).
58 See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, How International Rules Die, 93 GEO. L.J. 939 (2005);Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, 82 FOREIGN AFF. 16 (May/June 2003). Foran effort to demonstrate that the jus ad bellum regime does impose prudential restraints on themajor powers, “altering the manner and timing of their military actions in accordance with thelegal arguments they have offered (or intend to offer) to justify those actions,” so much so that insome cases it contributes to the failure of those actions, see JOEL H. WESTRA, INTERNATIONALLAW AND THE USE OF ARMED FORCE: THE UN CHARTER AND THE MAJOR POWERS 2, 153-54(2007).
exceptions.56 On this approach, the Article 2(4)/51 construct sets forth imprecise standards that mustbe refined through state practice, so clever interpretations of what it means to use force “againstterritorial integrity” in Article 2(4) or what Article 51 means when it refers to an “inherent right” ofself-defense allow these critics to embrace contemporary uses of force that are seen as desirable.Such interpretations are creative, but not particularly persuasive, and certainly have not garneredwidespread support. Other critics adopt a more protean view, stating that the enormous changes ininter-state relations since 1945 merit rethinking the jus ad bellum.57 Many international relationstheorists and some international lawyers see the jus ad bellum as simply no longer reflectingcontemporary law at all, if it ever did. For them, the jus ad bellum is essentially window dressing,trotted out by the major powers when it serves their interests to do so, but shoved aside without muchado when its proscriptions are inconvenient.58
Can this state of affairs, in the long term, endure? Will the current situation remain onehundred years hence? Given the uncertainty that has existed since 1945, it might plausibly be arguedthat maintaining the status quo is feasible and even desirable. The relatively conservative approachin static jus ad bellum helps discourage pernicious uses of force by limiting exceptions to the Article
222(4) prohibition. While some further deviations might be desirable, and while lawyers may like tohave clear and transparent rules that are routinely and uniformly followed, perhaps law in this areashould be somewhat vague, generally coercing states into pacific behavior but providing enough“play-in-the-joints” to accommodate major power politics in a world that cannot be neatly packaged.To navigate those uncertainties, a Security Council exists to help interpret when a state ranges toofar outside the gray lines, thereby tacitly allowing some uses of force (e.g., Israel’s preemptive self-defense in the 1967 War) while rejecting others (e.g., Israel’s attack on the Osirak nuclear facility).Similarly, the Security Council is available to authorize uses of force that are necessary to addressextraordinary circumstances that do not fit static jus ad bellum, such as to stop a government frominflicting genocide or crimes against humanity upon its own people. On this account, the mainpurposes of the Article 2(4)/Article 51 paradigm have been met by essentially eliminating therecourse to war for territorial expansion, and largely reducing other types of coercion by forcingstates to justify their actions as self-defense against an armed attack, and to risk the approbationwhen the justification is weak. The system may not be perfect, but states are generally comfortablewith it, and it is relatively stable.
 On the other hand, a fairly plausible case can be made that there is already far too muchconfusion and uncertainty in how the jus ad bellum, as crafted in 1945, should be applied inaddressing the wide range of contemporary threats, and that matters may well get worse over the nextcentury. While transboundary uses of force may not be a daily occurrence, they are not infrequent,and their adverse affects can be quite grave. The casualness with which Turkey may move armedforces across the border into Iraq to attack PKK bases (discussed below), without any notablecondemnation by the international community of the action as unlawful, is striking. Any normativesystem has gaps and uncertainties, but the list of challenges to the jus ad bellum—on rescue ofnationals, humanitarian intervention, indirect aggression, responses to coercion not considered an“armed attack,” responses to coercion by non-state actors, anticipatory self-defense, preemptive self-defense—is rather long.
The Security Council does condemn and occasionally act against some of the most egregious
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59 See, e.g., Therese O'Donnell, Naming and Shaming: The Sorry Tale of Security CouncilResolution 1530 (2004), 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 945 (2006). 
60 Human Rights Watch, Civilians under Assault: Hezbollah’s Rocket Attacks on Israel inthe 2006 War (Aug. 29, 2007), available at <http://hrw.org/reports/2007/iopt0807/. HumanRights Watch also concluded that, in its response, Israel frequently failed to distinguish between
violations of the jus ad bellum, but the system is not, and should not, be designed to regard aspermissible all uses of force that are not condemned by the Security Council; indeed, even whenblatant aggression occurs, the Security Council does not always act, such as when Iraq invaded Iranin 1980 or Eritrea invaded Ethiopia in 1998. Moreover, as is well known, even after the Cold War,the Security Council is inhibited from either condemning or authorizing uses of force when any oneof the five permanent members politically opposes such action, as occurred with respect to Kosovoin 1999. While there are areas of common interests among the Security Council members, thoseinterests are often not in alignment, as can be seen in recent discussions over how to address Iran’snascent nuclear program (resistance from Russia) or the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, Sudan(resistance from China). And, like any institution, the Security Council makes mistakes.59
To illuminate the problem with the status quo, one might consider the range of conflictingpractice over just the past two years with regard to whether a state may respond to a terrorist attackby undertaking a cross-border raid against a terrorist camp without the consent of the host state: 
• In the summer of 2006, the Hezbollah movement, operating out of Lebanon, crossedinto Israel’s northern border, attacked and killed several Israeli soldiers, seizing twoas hostages, before returning to Lebanon. Israel responded by sending military forcesinto, and by bombing portions of, southern Lebanon in an effort to secure the releaseof the soldiers and to diminish Hezbollah’s military capabilities. During the courseof the hostilities, Hezbollah fired some 4,000 rockets across the border into Israel,which Human Rights Watch determined intentionally targeted the civilianpopulation.60 Rather than condemn Israel’s action, the Security Council expressed
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military and civilian targets, and failed to take adequate safeguards to prevent civilian casualties.See  Human Rights Watch, Why They Died: Civilian Casualties in Lebanon during the 2006 War(Sept. 6, 2007), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2007/lebanon0907/.
61 S.C. Res. 1701 (Aug. 11, 2006); see Andreas Zimmermann, The Second Lebanon War:Jus Ad Bellum, Jus In Bello and the Issue of Proportionality, 11 MAX PLANCK YRBK. U.N. LAW99 (2007); Tom Ruys, Crossing the Thin Blue Line: An Inquiry into Israel’s Recourse to Self-Defense Against Hezbollah, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 265 (2007).
62 See Griff Witte, 60 Gazans Killed in Incursion by Israel, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2008, atA1; Taghreed El-Khodary & Isabel Kershner, As Israelis Pull Out of Gaza, Hamas CelebratesRocketry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, at A1.
“its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israelsince Hezbollah’s attack on Israel on 12 July 2006" and welcomed Lebanon’s efforts“to extend its authority over its territory, through its own legitimate armed forces,such that there will be no weapons without the consent of the government of Lebanonand no authority other than that of the government of Lebanon.”61
• In January 2007, the Palestinian militant organization and political party Hamas waselected as the government of the Palestinian Authority. In June of that year, Hamasseized control of the Gaza strip from Fatah-controlled Palestinian security forces.Since 2002, Hamas has used homemade (relatively crude) Qassam rockets launchedfrom the Gaza Strip to hit Israeli towns in the Negev. More recently, Iranian-maderockets have allowed Hamas to reach large Israeli cities, such as Ashkelon(population of 120,000). That increased capability prompted Israel in early 2008 tolaunch a major military ground operation as well as air strikes against Hamas fightersin the Gaza Strip.62 To date, no resolutions have been adopted by the SecurityCouncil or General Assembly on the matter.
• In October 2007, the Turkish government received a one-year authorization from itsparliament to conduct military operations in northern Iraq against the Kurdish
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63 The parliamentary vote was 507 to 19 in favor of using military force by means ofstrategic strikes or a large-scale invasion. See Molly Moore, Turkey Authorizes Iraq Incursion,WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2007, at A1. Both the United States and the European Union haveclassified the PKK as a terrorist organization.
64 Id.
65 See Alissa Rubin & Sabrina Tavernise, Turkey’s Warplanes Attack Villages in IraqiKurdistan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2008, at A9; Joshua Partlow, Turkey Resumes Strikes in Iraq’sNorth, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2008, at A18.
66 See Sabrina Tavernise & Richard Oppel, After 8 Days, Turkey Pulls Its Troops Out ofIraq, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2008, at A8.
67 See Joby Warrick & Robin Wright, Unilateral Strike Called a Model For U.S.Operations in Pakistan, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2008, at A1.
separatist guerilla organization known as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (or PKK).63Since its founding in the 1970's, the PKK has sponsored numerous attacks againstTurkish forces as a part of its campaign to establish an independent Kurdistan. Bysome estimates, over the past three decades, Turkey has responded with twenty-fourcross-border attacks into Iraq,64 but has failed to route the PKK. The most recentresponse involved air strikes against PKK camps and villages,65 as well as an eight-day ground offensive.66 Although both the United States and the European Unionexpressed concerns about Turkey’s action, to date no resolutions have been adoptedby the Security Council, the General Assembly, the European Union, or NATOcondemning Turkey’s conduct as unlawful.
• In January 2008, the United States launched a pilotless CIA Predator aircraft from abase within Pakistani territory which proceeded to fire two Hellfire missiles into acompound of buildings near the Pakistani town of Mir Ali, reportedly killing a seniorAl Qaeda commander. While the United States previously had requested specificpermission from the Pakistani government for such operations, in this instance suchpermission was not sought,67 though it may have been the product of a general U.S.-
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68 See Eric Schmitt & David Sanger, Pakistan Shift Could Curtail Drone Strikes, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 22, 2008, at A1; Robin Wright & Joby Warrick, U.S. Steps Up Unilateral Strikes inPakistan, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2008, at A1.
69 See Stephanie McCrummen, U.S. Strike in Somalia Targets Terror Suspects, WASH.POST, Mar. 4, 2008, at A13.
70 U.S. Rules of Engagement for Iraq, available athttp://www.wikileaks.org/wiki/US_Rules_of_Engagement_for_Iraq.
Pakistani arrangement allowing unilateral U.S. action.68
• In December 2006, Ethiopian military forces ousted from power in Somalia a groupof Sharia Courts known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU had unitedthemselves to form a rival administration to the Transitional Federal Government(TFG) of Somalia, and had succeeded in controlling most of southern Somalia andthe vast majority of its population. Since ouster of the ICU from power, the UnitedStates has launched from its naval vessels at least four missile strikes in Somaliaagainst Islamic leaders accused of being terrorists.69 (For example, one of the strikestargetted a Kenyan who is believed to have played a major role in the bombings oftwo U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998.) The TFG reportedly has allowed the UnitedStates a free hand in undertaking such attacks though, since the TFG faces awidespread civil war, its ability to authorize external interference is open to question.
• A classified 2005 U.S. document concerning rules of engagement in Iraq envisagedthe ability of U.S. military forces to cross from Iraq into Iran, Syria or other countriesbordering Iraq, even without those countries’ consent.70 Generally, such action wasonly authorized after securing approval from the U.S. Secretary of Defense, whichmight entail obtaining Presidential approval. Yet according to the document,Secretary of Defense approval was not necessary in situations of hot pursuit from Iraqinto Iran or Syria against former members of Saddam Hussein’s government andterrorists, or “when Syria or Iran cannot or will not prevent a hostile force from using
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72 See James McKinley, Jr., Nicaragua Breaks Ties With Bogotá, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7,2008, at A6.
73 The United States was the only county in the Western Hemisphere expressly supportingthe Colombian action.  See Simon Romero, Regional Bloc Says Ecuador’s Sovereignty WasViolated, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2008, at A3. The resolution provided:Considering:That on the morning of Saturday, March 1, 2008, military forces and policepersonnel of Colombia entered the territory of Ecuador, in the province of Sucumbíos,without the express consent of the government of Ecuador to carry out an operationagainst members of an irregular group of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombiawho were clandestinely encamped on the Ecuadorian side of the border;That that act constitutes a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity ofEcuador and of principles of international law;. . . . 
their airspace, land territory, internal waters or territorial seas to attack US and/ordesignated forces and the hostile force constitutes an imminent threat to ongoingoperations.71
• On March 1, 2008,  Colombian military forces bombed and crossed into Ecuador toattack guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), whomaintain camps along the border. Colombia regards the FARC as a terrorist anddrug-trafficking organization, while some in the region see them as revolutionariesfighting a U.S.-backed puppet government. Ecuador and Venezuela responded to theraid by sending troops to their borders with Colombia, while Nicaragua broke offdiplomatic relations with Colombia.72 In this instance, neither the Security Councilnor the General Assembly condemned that action. The Organization of AmericanStates, however, adopted a resolution declaring the Colombian raid to be a violationof Ecuador’s sovereignty, though stopping short of expressly condemningColombia.73
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Resolves,1. To reaffirm the principle that the territory of a state is inviolable and may not bethe object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken byanother State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatsoever. . . . OAS CP/Res. 930 (1632/08) (Mar. 5, 2008).
74 In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All, Reportof the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005, paras. 122-23 (Mar. 21, 2005).
These examples indicate that many states are concerned about the legality of the cross-borderuses of force against terrorist camps, but that condemnation on the basis of a legal violation is erratic,perhaps suggesting that a much more nuanced legal standard may be operating than is captured bythe static jus ad bellum paradigm. On issues such as this, as time progresses,  the static jus ad bellumposition may become increasingly questioned and viewed as untenable or unconvincing. 
Hence, the argument against the status quo is that civilized societies can and should do better,at least if they aspire to the maintenance of international peace and security through predicable andtransparent processes. As Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated in his 2005 report In LargerFreedom,
an essential part of the consensus we must seek must be agreement on when and how forcecan be used to defend international peace and security. In recent years, this issue has deeplydivided Member States. They have disagreed about whether States have the right to usemilitary force pre-emptively, to defend themselves against imminent threats; whether theyhave the right to use it preventively to defend themselves against latent or non-imminentthreats; and whether they have the right—or perhaps the obligation—to use it protectivelyto rescue the citizens of other States from genocide or comparable crimes. . . . Agreementmust be reached on these questions if the United Nations is to be—as it was intended tobe—a forum for resolving differences rather than a mere stage for acting them out.74
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In the face of such uncertainty, consideration should be given to a formal reaffirmation of thestatic jus ad bellum position if that position truly reflects contemporary global expectations. By“reaffirmation” of the static jus ad bellum, I do not mean a statement of the kind that was issued atthe 2005 World Summit. At that meeting, some 150 world leaders adopted a declaration that, amongother things, reiterated “the obligation of all Member States to refrain in their international relationsfrom the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations,”75and reaffirmed “that the relevant provisions of the Charter are sufficient to address the full range ofthreats to international peace and security.”76 Such a “reaffirmation” fails to grapple directly withdiffering interpretations of what the Charter actually requires—it simply papers over thosedifferences. Instead, a true reaffirmation would specifically address how the jus ad bellum relatesto contemporary threats.
Alternatively,  if contemporary global expectations diverge from the static position, then arecodification of the jus ad bellum may in order. By recodification, I mean a restatement of therudimentary rules of the jus ad bellum in light of the wide range of threats that have already occurredand will continue to occur in the years to come. In essence, it would be an effort to engage in thesame conversation today that occurred when the major powers at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 draftedwhat became Article 2(4) and when the San Francisco conference adopted Article 51 in 1945.
Trying to reaching a consensus either on a reaffirmation of the static jus ad bellum positionor on a recodification of the changed jus ad bellum may well be politically infeasible, given thesignificance of the issue, the rhetorical posturing that governments engage in, the considerable dividebetween more powerful and less powerful states, and the potential for any process to be sidetrackedby current events. Recent efforts by even non-governmental entities, such as the ICISS and the 2005U.N. high-level panel , have revealed the difficulties and controversy that any such effort will entail.Indeed, a credible argument might be made that the only point at which the jus ad bellum will be ripe
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for either reaffirmation or recodification is when it completely breaks down, ushering in a new erafor rebuilding or strengthening international institutions. The ICISS’s Responsibility to Protect reportcandidly noted that “it would be impossible to find consensus, in the Commission's view, around anyset of proposals for military intervention which acknowledged the validity of any intervention notauthorized by the Security Council or General Assembly.”77 
Indeed, perhaps the strongest argument for adhering to the status quo is not that the static jusad bellum is a stable and intrinsically optimal regime, but that efforts to move to a more proteanconception will be even more destabilizing, forcing states and non-state actors to confront anormative system over which they have fundamental disagreements. Deep schisms between powerfulstates and less-powerful states,  and even among close allies, may well be revealed and become moreentrenched. The considerable difficulties that the NATO states encountered in identifying a legaltheory justifying their actions to protect Kosovo provide a window on the problems that would befaced in either reaffirming or recodifying the jus ad bellum. Imagine the difficulty in securingagreement between the United States and the developing world about preemptive self-defense, orbetween France and China over humanitarian intervention, and the problem becomes manifest. Assuch, better to let sleeping dogs lie. 
Nevertheless, given that efforts like ICISS or the High Level Panel are already occurring,we may be entering a period where a reaffirmation or recodification of the jus ad bellum is viewedas politically feasible and desirable. While strong adherence to the core paradigm remains, powerfulsentiments are emerging in favor of a more sophisticated normative system, driven by the rise ofhuman rights, the threat of terrorism, and the fear of weapons of mass destruction. As thesesentiments become more insistent, initiatives such as ICISS and the 2005 U.N. high-level panel mayprove to be just the first wave in efforts to revisit and reevaluate the jus ad bellum. Developingcountries, faced with issues such as threats of non-proliferation, are acting in a manner that might
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not have been predicted even a few years ago.78
Notably, the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute contemplates that the Court willexercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once the states parties adopt a provision at theirreview conference (scheduled for 2010) setting forth a definition of aggression and the conditionsunder which the Court could exercise its jurisdiction over it.79  At present, a special working grouphas been established by the ICC Assembly of State Parties toward that end, and may result in aformulation of aggression that reaffirms or recodifies the static jus ad bellum. Even if the ICC’s workessentially cross-references to the UN Charter, leaving current uncertainties intact, placingaggression within the scope of the ICC’s mandate may well galvanize states into a reaffirmation orrecodification process, as a means of clarifying when government leaders may be exposed to chargesof criminal conduct. Some states may resist reaching a consensus, but non-state actors may bepowerful agitators for a consensus position to emerge. And while it often seems that certain hurdlesin interstate relations are insurmountable, there are plenty of examples, even in recent years, of thosehurdles being swept aside by  powerful currents of history (the reunification of Germany, the demiseof South African apartheid, or the establishment of an international criminal court come to mind).
Defenders of static jus ad bellum might be correct that, notwithstanding all the new inter-stateinfluences since 1945, the prevailing view today is still in favor of a strictly interpreted jus adbellum; but if that is true, perhaps the time has come to formally reaffirm it. If it is not true, thenperhaps the time has come to recodify the jus ad bellum so as to ensure its continuing relevance forinter-state relations and to provide it with a stronger pedigree than currently exists.
B. Debating Reaffirmation or Recodification
32If maintaining the status quo is unstable, what directions should a contemporary debate overthe jus ad bellum take? A starting point might be to approach the jus ad bellum more holistically thanis usually the case. The standard approach in international legal analysis is to slice the jus ad bellumup into segments, in which consideration is given to issues such as rescue of nationals, humanitarianintervention, anticipatory self-defense, and so on. Within each segment, state practice is tallied upas showing either “legality” or “illegality” so as to reach a conclusion about the permissibility ofusing force in that particular context. Yet doing so is unsatisfactory, given that state practice tendsto be spare, conflicting, and susceptible to alternative interpretations.
If instead, one were to step back from these segments so as to ask broader questions aboutwhen it is that the global community (however that might be defined) generally seems to favor usesof force, then the picture might become clearer. Certain general parameters would seem to berelatively accurate in helping to predict whether coercive behavior is acceptable, no matter thecontext in which it is deployed. Those parameters might concern: (1) the degree of coercion actuallyinflicted by State A upon State B or its nationals; (2) the gravity of coercion that State A fears fromState B; (3) the extent to which other States are condoning State A’s coercion; (4) the pedigree ofState B as a member of the international community; (5) the degree to which State A’s coercion istailored to respond to the threat from State B; or (6) the degree to which State A’s coercion hasadverse collateral consequences for other states or persons.
Under such a holistic approach,  one would not read the global response to the attacks of 9/11as solely relevant to the issue of permissible uses of force against a non-state actor, although it iscertainly relevant to that issue. Rather, one would apply the precedent more broadly as relevant toour understanding of how the jus ad bellum operates in various circumstances. In other words, the9/11 precedent can shed light on: (1) what constitutes an armed attack?; (2) how immediate must alikely further attack be before a state can respond in self-defense?; (3) what level of collectivesupport or endorsement is possible when embarking on an act of self-defense?; (4) what kinds ofdelinquent acts might be held against a state from its past when considering its ability to invokestandard rights of sovereignty today under international law?; and (5) how does the gravity of the
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attack effect the scope of necessity and proportionality accorded to the defending state?
A second beneficial direction might entail analyzing relevant norms or instruments that arenot, strictly speaking, a part of the jus ad bellum, but that offer a window on contemporarycommunity expectations. For example, in thinking through whether a state can engage in self-defenseagainst a non-state actor who is believed to be acquiring weapons of mass destruction, it seemsrelevant to note that the Security Council in 2004 decided that all states must prohibit non-stateactors in their territory from manufacturing or acquiring such weapons.80 Assuming that theresolution is within the power of the Security Council (some have claimed it to be ultra vires), thenit seems highly relevant to the issue of the relationship of a state to non-state actors in its territory,and may serve to bridge whatever links of attribution are necessary to allow self-defense against thatnon-state actor.
Similarly, one might consider how evolutions in the jus in bello over time might be affectingthe jus ad bellum. The 2006 U.S. Supreme Court case Hamdan v. Rumsfeld81 reached the conclusionthat when common Article 3 refers to an armed conflict that is not international in nature, thatincludes the conflict between the United States and al Qaeda. One can argue about whether that wasthe right conclusion: (1) on the one hand, according certain minimal protections to the Guantanomodetainees using common Article 3 and Protocol I Article 75 seems like a good thing; (2) on the otherhand, Common Article 3 was probably intended only to address internal armed conflict, nottransnational armed conflict involving a state and a non-state actor. The point, however, is that if theHamdan court is right—or even if we set aside the Hamdan decision and simply consider theprotections that exist in common Article 3 and Protocol II for non-state actors—one arrives at a placewhere the jus in bello is trying to take account of and regulate activities relating to non-state actors.Should not the jus ad bellum do so as well? 
34In an essay of this length, a standard ploy might be to plead that there is not enough time toactually craft a proposed reaffirmation or recodification but, as a starting point, one could imaginethe following as possible starting points:
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Reaffirmation of Static Jus Ad Bellum Recodification of Protean Jus Ad Bellum1. The use or threat of use of armed force byone state against another state is prohibited inall circumstances unless:a) taken in response to a prior armed attack byanother state until the Security Council hastaken the measures necessary to maintaininternational peace and security; orb) authorized by the Security Council as ameans of addressing,  under Chapter VII ofthe Charter, a threat to the peace, breach ofthe peace, or act of aggression.2. Measures taken in the exercise of the rightof self-defense shall be immediately reportedto the Security Council.3. All uses of armed force must be necessaryand proportionate in relation to the threat thathas arisen and must be undertaken inaccordance with applicable internationalhumanitarian law.
1. The use or threat of use of armed force by one stateagainst another state is prohibited unless undertakenin accordance with paragraphs (2)-(6).2. The Security Council may authorize the use ofarmed force by a state as a means of addressing, under Chapter VII of the Charter, a threat to the peace,breach of the peace, or act of aggression.3. A state may use or threaten to use armed forceagainst another state in response to an actual orimminent armed attack by that other state, includingan attack in the form of the seizure of nationals, untilthe Security Council has taken the measures necessaryto maintain international peace and security.4. A state may use or threaten to use armed forceagainst another state in response to an actual orimminent widespread deprivation of fundamentalhuman rights, after notification to and debate of thematter at the Security Council, until the SecurityCouncil has taken the measures necessary to maintaininternational peace and security. To the extentpossible, such action shall be taken through regionalor sub-regional organizations.5. States may use or threaten to use armed forceagainst a non-state actor located in another state in thecircumstances set forth in (3), but only if the otherstate has been provided a reasonable opportunity toaddress the matter directly, and has either refused todo so or is incapable of doing so.6. Measures taken under (3), (4), or (5) shall beimmediately reported to the Security Council.7. All uses of armed force must be necessary andproportionate in relation to the threat that has arisen andmust be undertaken in accordance with applicableinternational humanitarian law.
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Obviously, certain normative choices have been made in the proposed reaffirmation andproposed recodification, placing them at somewhat opposite ends of a potential spectrum of options.Further, the proposals above largely remain captured by the subject matter divisions in possible usesof force, rather than utilizing some of the more abstract (and perhaps controversial) factors suggestedpreviously in this section. Nevertheless, these proposals may serve as a starting point for acheivinga consensus on the contemporary preferences of states or non-state actors regarding the jus adbellum.
C. The Means of a Reaffirmation or Recodification
The political feasibility of reaffirming or recodifying the jus ad bellum would turn onaddressing not just the substance of the law but the means for establishing that substance. The  mostformal means of change, amendment of the Charter, is the least likely path to success, while the leastformal change, through statements of non-governmental actors, may attract insufficient stateadherence to be effective. Various possibilities exist that will no doubt be explored, to one degreeor another, in the years to come.
Through Amendment of Charter. Though the Charter can be amended, the process for doingso is cumbersome, requiring a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and thenratification by two thirds of the UN members, including all the permanent members of the SecurityCouncil.82 Successful amendments have only occurred five times, all on issues relating to theincrease in the size of the UN membership, not as a means of altering the substantive rights andobligations set forth in the Charter. Hence, the procedural hurdles of this process are quite significantand, absent tectonic shifts in geopolitics, likely insurmountable.
Through UNGA Resolution. Technically, the General Assembly has no express power toissue a resolution binding upon all states as to the meaning of Articles 2(4) and 51. Nevertheless,the travaux preparatoires of the Charter, and the jurisprudence of the International Court, haverecognized the competence of organs of the United Nations, in the first instance, to interpret
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provisions of the Charter relevant to their work. Though the Security Council is the principal UNorgan for addressing peace and security, it is not the exclusive authority, leaving to the GeneralAssembly an important and relevant role.83 Further, since the General Assembly has within itrepresentation of all states, resolutions that it adopts by consensus or by overwhelming majority thatpurport to recognize existing norms of international law can be highly authoritative evidence thatsuch law exists. With respect to the jus ad bellum, the General Assembly has previously played a rolethrough its adoption of various resolutions, including its resolutions on friendly relations84 and, aspreviously noted, on aggression, and remains available to do so today, as evidenced by the 2005World Summit Outcome document. 
The problem with this venue is that the General Assembly has not proven to be a particularlyeffective body for engaging in sophisticated brokering of views between states over contentiousissues. The political dynamics within the Assembly tends to drive toward an outcome that either onlyreflects the largest bloc of non-aligned states or that represents a consensus view concerning text thathas little meaning. Whether a global parliament85 based on popular representation, rather than onrepresentation of states, would avoid such pitfalls is unclear, but if one were to emerge it, too, couldbe a potential venue. 
Through UNSC Resolution. This option may represent the most intriguing possibility, giventhe increased activity of the Security Council in the post-Cold War era, the power of the SecurityCouncil to issue decisions that bind all UN members, and the Council’s willingness to engage in“legislative-type” resolutions on fundamental security issues, such as controls on terrorist financingand proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.86 At present there seems to be little P-5 agreement
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on a recodification of the jus ad bellum, but there are emerging areas of common interest (e.g., theability to strike at terrorist havens) and it not beyond imagination that at some point a politicalalignment would occur to issue a resolution that “clarifies” the meaning of the jus ad bellum. 
Through Major Power Agreement. If reaching agreement within the major politicalinstitutions is difficult, another path would be for the major powers to reach agreement on instanceswhen they favor or at least will not oppose uses of military force, as well as those circumstanceswhere they will oppose the use of force. The composition of this group might include the P-5 andother states, or might be more oriented toward North American and West European states. Anyproduct from such a group by itself would be non-binding, but it would help illuminate the beliefsof those states who are most likely to deploy military force. Other states could react to whateverdeclaration emerges from this process, providing a basis for identifying areas of agreement anddisagreement.
Through Case Law. At least within international legal circles, there is an acceptance that thedecisions of the International Court of Justice and other competent international courts carryconsiderable weight in identifying international law, including changes that have occurred in the law.To the extent that the jus ad bellum requires reaffirmation or recodification, which cannot be securedthrough political organs of the United Nations, then perhaps international courts are the place tolook. Arguably reaffirmation is exactly what the International Court has done in its jurisprudence;its decision in the Oil Platforms case87 might best be understood as confirming the static jus adbellum and eschewing any explicit, significant new contribution to the notion of self-defence.88
One problem with reliance on case law, however, is that the cases are extremely sparse andoften present anomalous factual scenarios that are not easily or convincingly extrapolated to broaderstatements about the meaning of the jus ad bellum. Indeed, given the importance of the subject, it
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is rather remarkable that the International Court went for fifty years having only squarely addressedthe jus ad bellum in one case (the Nicaragua case). In the post-Cold War era, there has been asomewhat greater willingness for cases to be brought to the Court and for the Court to address, onthe merits, matters related to the jus ad bellum. Yet even so, cases such as the 1996 AdvisoryOpinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons,89 the 1998 Spain/Canada Fisheries Jurisdiction case90 (which provided the Court an opportunity to opine on what sort of coercion does not squarely fallwithin Article 2(4) of the Charter), the 2003 Iranian Oil Platforms judgment, 2004 Advisory Opinionon the Israeli Wall,91 and the 2005 Congo/Uganda Armed Activities case,92 have left many questionsunanswered about the contours of the jus ad bellum. Perhaps to fill the gap, other tribunals arejoining in as well. In December 2005, the Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission found that Eritreaviolated UN Charter Article 2(4) by invading and occupying parts of Ethiopia or Ethiopian-administered territory in May 1998.93 In September 2007, an arbitral panel convened under the Lawof the Sea Convention found a violation of Article 2(4), this time in the form of a threat to use forceby a Surinamese patrol boat against an oil rig.94 Yet these tribunals too have been fairly cautious andsometimes cursory in their treatment of the law. 
Broadly speaking, courts and tribunals have done little to advance understandings aboutwhether and how to adapt the jus ad bellum to contemporary threats or crises, with the most notableexample perhaps being the International Court’s cursory treatment of the issue of attacks by non-stateactors in the Israeli Wall advisory opinion. While a general advisory opinion might be sought from
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the International Court of Justice on the scope of contemporary jus ad bellum, it seems likely thatthe Court would be extremely cautious in issuing such an opinion, uncertain how its views might bereceived by states, and reluctant to provide more than the most general of views. Perhaps it is simplytoo much to expect international courts to lead the way in this area.
Through “Principles” Adopted by Non-State Actors. Considerable international legalscholarship in recent years has focused on the rise of the non-state actor as a critical feature of theways in which international law is created, interpreted, and even enforced.95 Epistemic communitiesoperating across boundaries are doing much to galvanize public opinion on key issues oftransnational law, which in turn influences the ways states conduct themselves. 
As the work of the  ICISS and the 2005 U.N. high-level panel show, there are roles that canbe played by non-governmental organizations or expert groups  in attempting to articulate and clarifythe central norms of the jus ad bellum. The work product of such initiatives is not regarded asbinding upon states, and hence may not be effective, but it can be the starting point for a process thatflowers into a formal arrangement, as may been seen in initiatives ranging from the regulation ofland mines to the establishment of the international criminal court.96
VII. CONCLUSION
While the jus ad bellum has a hardened normative core that is widely accepted by states, thereappears to be considerably less consensus around the margins of the norm, with its applicationchanging considerably based on the context in which the norm is being applied. In this sense, the jusad bellum has a much more protean nature than is commonly recognized by states and non-stateactors. The traditional approach of seeing uses of force as being lawful/unlawful base solely on
41whether they are taken in self-defense against a prior armed attack, or with Security Councilauthorization, increasingly seems unconvincing or, at a minimum, a poor predictor of the likelyresponse of the global community. That does not mean that the jus ad bellum has no part to play onthe margins; it retains an important  role in conditioning global conduct and reactions to that conduct,but that role may increasingly diminish in the years to come.
Three options present themselves. States and non-state actors can continue to operate underthe current system, which tends to view the jus ad bellum as a static law unchanged since 1945.Strong reasons support this option, including the claim that the current system is reasonably stableand could be significantly destablized by moving to a different position. Alternatively, if the existingsystem is not stable or will become unstable over time, and if that instability is partly due to a beliefin some quarters that times have changed since adoption of the original Charter paradigm, then statesand non-state actors could seek to reaffirm the static jus ad bellum, if that remains the consensusposition. Finally, if the status quo is untenable, and there is no consensus on the static view, thenstates and non-state actors might do well to seek consensus on a recodification of the jus ad bellumto reflect its protean nature. 
A formal reaffirmation or recodification in the near-term may be politically infeasible, butvarious factors may push the global community in that direction in the years to come. Even short ofdeveloping a new global consensus, for the jus ad bellum to retain a vibrant, authoritative role ininter-state relations, it likely needs to find ways to accommodate new threats to the global order,through more refined decisions of international courts, more sophisticated approaches tointernational treaties and UN resolutions, and sharper analysis in the academy. 
